INTRODUCTION not clear that we can describe what that term means. So, it may not be surprising that neither are there effective Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) face significant mechanisms that measure system security. Security security challenges due to the inability to confine a wireless researchers seek solutions, similar to those from other radio signal. Route security is vital to the proper operation disciplines, that are reasonably easy to compute and are and reliability of such protocols. If a malicious host can well-validated through years of observation and analysis. inject itself into the routing path, proper operation of the For example, reliability research recognizes system routing protocol is dependent on the attacker's intentions, availability (time in service/total time) and mean time to Unfortunately, there seems to be a wide gap between failure (total time/# failures) as widely applicable metrics providing security and the development of MANET routing that tend to reflect reality. protocols. Security is either ignored or security mechanisms
There have been attempts to produce a comprehensive are added as vulnerabilities or attacks are discovered. While security metric based on practice, probability, and this itself is not an ideal practice, it further complicates simulation [1, 2] , but no single metric or group of metrics determining the security of such protocols. Following a can comprehensively capture information security formalized software engineering approach allows properties. Rather, we discuss security properties in terms of the threat picture, essentially describing how individual chosen plaintext attacks, a cryptographically specific and continues until a system's death. However, the most intense meaningful definition. Conversely, formal methods are the verification activity occurs between system specification most commonly used approach to verify security protocols.
and implementation. The third verification category is Though there have been recent attempts to bridge this gap whether an approach can be used before an implementation [3] , there is no accepted method to combine these is available. A second strength of walkthroughs is that they mechanisms to get a comprehensive security picture.
are potentially effective in any development phase and are We contend that the five common security verification routinely used to verify security protocol conceptualization, mechanisms above each have different, often specification, and design . complimentary properties. We suggest how to leverage this Finally, we consider the rigor that the verification complementation to achieve more comprehensive security approach reflects, essentially if the approach is dependent evaluation and to facilitate understanding regarding how on the context. Walkthrough results are often presented as each approach fits in to a coordinated security verification prose descriptions and summaries, possibly reflective of evaluation.
human genius, but always subject to human We begin by structuring our argument around attack misunderstanding. Their meaning must always be evaluated verification categories. There has been a litany of work to within their intended context, so walkthrough results must address attack types, for example in replay attacks [4] and be considered to be context dependent. denial of service attacks [5] . We, however, are interested in Table I summarizes walkthrough verification approach verification approaches relative to pertinent attacks. To categories. The rest of this paper will fill in the table for the illustrate this concept, we first address the oldest verification other protocol verification approaches. We focus particular approach: coordinated discussion. In its more primitive effort, time, and discussion on simulation because our form, this technique reduces to human analysis, possibly experience reflects broad misunderstanding regarding consisting of a single analyst sitting down with a protocol simulation's capability to capture or represent security specification and a pencil. Modem verification research properties and notions (including some of our own). recognizes the importance of this technique, and has evolved it into the oft-dreaded structured walkthrough. testing, simulation provides a projection or approximation while it may lead to time wasted discussing remotely related of the protocol operation. Simulation-based study projecting items, it also often leads to otherwise difficult or impossible average case performance based on statistical analysis of to reach conclusions, independent runs has become the de facto standard for We also consider verification approaches in terms of network research and is not only an accepted validation whether they provide property guarantees, or whether they approach, but is a prerequisite for research result only provide security property evidence. Walkthroughs can publication. result in wide and deep analysis, but cannot provide Still, a wide range of factors can affect simulation complete verification for even simple properties.
results, and an improperly validated simulation can be Information system developers (maybe the most common misleading. Identical studies performed within different walkthrough users) well-recognize this limitation. However, simulation packages have been shown to produce they routinely conduct walkthroughs because walkthroughs inconsistent results . [6] . Additionally, physical layer identify problems that may be difficult and expensive to find modeling abstraction of wireless radio waves [7] , improper and fix later. This applies to security analysis as well.
Most modem development paradigms recognize that verification begins with the initial system conception and Conversely, execution testing occurs when executable artifacts are available. More on this later, statistical procedures [13] , and incomplete documentation properties that can be tested during simulations are those have significant impacts on simulation studies. Ultimately, that are approximated in the simulation. Accordingly, each simulation must be validated for its intended simulations are limited to testing attacks that are known a environment. There are many approaches to validating priori. Additionally, since simulations do not reflect the simulations. One way is to corroborate simulation models precise operating environment, they are dependent upon against actual implementations, i.e. to simulate concept their execution context. specifications and then view implementations created from A final strength of simulation, particularly computer the same specification and compare the results. If scientific simulation, is that repetitive testing with large data volumes rigor is applied, the simulation approach validity may be is usually possible and inexpensive. It is this characteristic illuminated.
that encourages companies to maintain computer A second way to validate a simulation approach is to simulations of existing systems, i.e. to allow maintenance compare simulation results to a different verification engineers to project change impacts without implementing approach. Corroborating simulation results through the potential changes. This characteristic is also valuable analytical proofs can add substantial credibility to the during initial development, particularly for generating verification result over simulation alone, performance estimates that lend themselves to probabilistic Clearly simulation is a powerful research tool with two analysis. Because simulations are statistically driven, major advantages:
performance is an effective simulation target. (1) Simulation allows a researcher to examine an idea's properties without implementing (or constructing) that idea.
Simulation and Security
Many different samplings can be evaluated and Though simulation has the potential to accurately configurations can be adjusted before and during estimate or project network performance, it is not as clear simulations to facilitate analysis and to optimize the how simulation can help to estimate network protocol resulting product. While simulation is not free, in most security. One security-related area where simulation has cases, it is much less expensive to simulate first then shown promise is Intrusion Detection. For example, [8] develop than it is to develop and test a concept without contains a report of an experiment simulating one hundred simulation. If this is not the case, simulation should not be and twenty hosts operating concurrently, using only five real undertaken. Fortunately, evolving industrial and commercial hosts (each real host simulated twenty four experimental simulation packages and frameworks often ensure easy and hosts). In this case, the production software is in place, but inexpensive simulation capabilities, the expected (or worst case) number of hosts is not. Thus, (2) Simulation allows the investigator to isolate the author uses simulation to give a system assessment, sections, components, subsystems, etc. during evaluation By although non-trivial artificiality remains. holding control items constant and varying specific, targeted
As far as network simulation goes, this environment is values, the investigator may more accurately examine relatively similar to the projected real operating specific, systemic cause and effect relationships.
environment. Conversely, mathematical, or computer Unfortunately, these two advantages also lead directly simulations such as NS-2, have only theoretical, sometimes to the two most common simulation pitfalls. First, because artificial, correlations with real environments. As a rule, the simulation is relatively inexpensive and easy (particularly less artificiality a simulation contains, the more credible its after the initial learning curve is overcome) investigators are results are. prone to misuse simulation in situations where it is not Another example of intrusion -detection simulation scientifically suited. This is a major point of our paper and comes from Defense Advance Research Project Agency we discuss this issue more later.
(DARPA) intrusion detection systems research [9, 10] . In Secondly, in modern information systems, there are few this work, MIT Lincoln Laboratory tested various intrusion components that operate in isolation. Isolated simulation detection systems against simulated network traffic, parameters may not accurately reflect how the system will consisting of normal background traffic and attack traffic. operate when components are interacting. Of course,
The systems were rated according to the percentage of simulation is only valuable if it accurately projects how attacks detected vs. the false alarms per day. constructed systems will operate in the real world (i.e. after
These evaluations lean more toward testing than they are constructed). Simulations that reflect isolated simulation, since they involve mostly functional systems. properties can help an analyst to optimize those properties,
The simulation exists in traffic formation. If real world but the analyst must consider how the isolated adjustments traffic was fed into the target systems, we would consider will impact overall system operation.
this "beta testing". Conversely, if purely synthetic traffic In one sense, simulation is nothing more than testing of was used, we would consider this a testing process. an approximation of the proposed system. The only However, actual traffic was simulated real world traffic with inserted attack streams and obfuscated addresses. The traffic scenario only. These protocols may react differently under was synthetically generated to statistically simulate real real-world implementations or under different types of network traffic. The attack traffic consisted of various types attacks. Hence, simulation can only provide results for the of attacks that were both well known and some were new at attacks and the environment simulated for that scenario. the time of testing.
Moreover, the simulation essence in these cases again The only properties we can determine with this type of reflects the security property performance impacts. Security security testing is how these systems perform against these verification should reveal the mechanism's security specific simulated attacks in this specific environment (i.e.
properties relative to the target threat picture. the simulated background traffic). These results cannot
In addition to performance analysis, simulation can determine the effectiveness of any of these systems against assist in attack visualization. For instance, simulating a any other attacks or different network profiles other than worm attack may provide insight into how a given worm those that were tested. While one system may work well may infiltrate and spread across a network. Unfortunately, under a given set of conditions (background traffic and the predominate network research simulation tool, NS-2, attack type), it may operate completely differently under does not provide adequate facilities for simulating MANETs different network conditions and different attacks than to this end. The NS-2 visualization tool, Network Animator which it was tested against.
(NAM), is not intended for wireless use [12] . It shows wireless transmission ranges as footprint circles, but does Security in MANET Simulations not actually show how a packet propagates across a wireless
To date, we are yet to see a simulation that reflects network. The Colorado School of the Mines developed an MANET protocol security properties. Further, we contend independent visualization tool called the interactive NS-2 that exercise of a MANET routing protocol against a protocol and environment confirmation tool (iNSpect) [13] . simulated attack will only provide information on how well
This tool provides animations to allow node mobility the protocol defended against the simulated attacks under tracking and visualizes both successful and unsuccessful the simulated conditions. However, these simulations can packet transmissions between wireless nodes within NS-2 tell us very little protocol security properties under actual simulations. operating conditions.
As we have noted, correctly performed simulation can Awerbuch et al. propose an example of a MANET project MANET routing protocol average-case performance. simulation to determine the performance of two wireless
In many cases, average-case performance analysis is routing protocols under various Byzantine attacks [11] . acceptable, since outliers or statistical anomalies do not These include black hole, flood rushing, and wormhole noticeably affect general protocol performance. Conversely, attacks in wireless networks in which all nodes are security must focus on "worst case" issues. That is, the authenticated. The threat of Byzantine attacks, one in which attacker only has to find a single entry point to completely a node with appropriate authentication and keying material compromise a system. Simulating security vulnerabilities, or is captured or obtained by an adversary, is a significant malicious attacks, can only be as precise as the data threat in wireless ad hoc networks, programmed into the simulation. While this method merits A Byzantine attacker can participate in the routing consideration in understanding and studying known attacks, protocol virtually undetected since it is an authorized node. it does not provide insight into how well a protocol deals Once a malicious node is chosen as part of a data route, it with classes of attacks or unknown attacks. can drop packets during data transmission. The authors [11 ] Additionally, like testing, simulation cannot ensure that present the On-Demand Secure Byzantine Routing no vulnerability exists in analyzed protocols. Instead, we (ODSBR) protocol, which was developed to defend against can use simulation to discover/detect the specific attacks such attacks. Simulation is used to show how ODSBR and programmed into the simulation, which can be used as Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) perform evidence of modeled security properties. against various Byzantine attacks, while differing the number of attackers. The simulation shows that ODSBR is OTHER WAYS TO ANALYZE SECURITY less susceptible to packet loss than AODV under these attacks. It also depicts that intelligent node placement (i.e. a Experimental observation, analytical proofs, and formal malicious node in the center of the network) increases the methods provide additional means to study MANET routing probability that an attack will succeed.
protocol security. As with simulation, none of these According to the simulation results, one may view techniques can prove complete security, but each has ODSBR as more secure that AODV. This is not necessarily characteristics that can improve security property a true statement, the packet delivery rate of ODSBR was understanding. more resilient to attacks than AODV in the simulated Experimental Observation individual problem. For instance, two different researchers Protocol implementation and testing provides valuable may attempt to prove a protocol property two completely data to determine protocol security. As protocols are different ways. The outcome can provide a reader with developed, they can be tested against known attacks and multiple or ambiguous interpretations of the problem. active vulnerability assessments may discover security One strong advantage of proof systems is that they can flaws. A more thorough approach of open source prevent unknown attacks by mathematically guarantying implementations allows other researchers to independently proven protocol security properties or goals. Proofs can be test protocols in operation and perform increased done at any time in the design phase or in operation if new vulnerability analysis. Relating to our verification attacks or vulnerabilities are discovered. categories, formal testing rarely determines unknown attacks, since test-cases are designed with current attack Formal Methods knowledge. Additionally, testing can show evidence of Formal methods attempt to remove ambiguous proof security properties, but cannot provide guarantees on results by eliminating a researcher's individual approach to securities. Testing cannot begin until the protocols have deductive proofs. Formal methods implement a rigorous, been implemented and are then dependent on the standardized process to provide for unambiguous results. environment in which they were tested.
That is, two researchers following the same formal method Protocol realization and formal testing naturally leads should come to the same results and conclusions. The to beta-testing by releasing to willing participants. Betainclusion of formal methods analysis on MANET security testing does not follow a formalized test process with properties in published research allow all readers to predetermined test cases; however, it allows for further independently verify the results by following the rules of the assessment, increased protocol analysis, and a greater given formal method. chance to encounter vulnerabilities (which may or may not
We discuss the formal method BAN logic, which was be detected) that occur during normal protocol operation.
introduced by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham in 1989 [15] . The beta-test advantage is that unknown attacks may be BAN was developed to evaluate trust relationships within detected before they product is widely distributed, authentication protocols. Evaluating a protocol in BAN There is little information in the literature regarding follows four basic steps: implemented and tested MANET protocols, though 1. State the protocol goals MANETs are emerging in industry. This is due to the fact 2. Convert the protocol to an "idealized" (BAN) form that most of the research in this area is still in early concept 3. State the assumptions development. This however is not a "free-ticket" for 4. Apply BAN logic to the protocol messages and simulation based research. MANET simulations should assumptions to derive the goals continue, but be balanced and validated against real-world Even though BAN logic follows a formalized process, implementations.
errors can still be injected into the analysis. . SRP is an extension of the Dynamic Source Routing technique to confirm packet deliverability for various gossip (DSR) protocol by attempting to guarantee that a malicious protocols [14] . Essentially, they prove probabilistic node is not part of a valid route between two end-points. broadcast delivery properties in the face of Byzantine These authors conclude that SRP is resilient to all attacks threats. The authors use formal proofs to provide upper that do not depend on multiple cooperating malicious nodes. bounds on the propagation failure of these gossip protocols; Disturbingly, this is not a true conclusion, Marshall et al. however, limitations still exist. This technique can result in [17] show that a single malicious node can inject itself into imprecision, since the proofs provide for upper bounds the route path undetected to the to the BAN analysis analysis and generally are used to compare orders of performed by Papadimitratos and Haas. magnitude. This is not a failure of BAN logic, but shows how BAN Also, as free-form arguments, proof techniques are logic was used to incorrectly analyze security properties of a dependent on assumptions and are prone to influence by MANET routing protocol. BAN truly was developed to unstated assumptions according to the mathematical abilities analyze trust between authorized parties and not to analyze of the researcher, the proof complexity, and other security properties in the face of malicious hosts [15] . environmental issues. Proofs must be tailored to an Unfortunately, confusion still exists between the difference of "trust" vs. security. We view BAN as a logic to show
While we have shown that we can identify some protocol correctness, which may alleviate this confusion.
unknown attacks and determine if a protocol property is This shows that formal methods can identify unknown met, we cannot claim complete security. This problem is attacks, while at the same time may not identify all possible analogous to the software engineering approach to testing, unknown attacks. State protocol properties can be proven we recall that it is impossible to tell if software is defect free with correct formal methods approaches. As with analytical from testing. Quoting Dijkstra [22] , "Program testing can be proofs, formal methods can be performed at any stage of used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their protocol development or operation. BAN logic is dependent absence!" This is analogous to using any of the presented on the idealization step and assumptions, therefore, we techniques to prove security, in that the presence of known consider this a semi-formal method. True formal methods, vulnerabilities can be easily shown, but it is impossible to such as strand spaces [18] 
